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Abstract-The paper presents a dynamic mode1 of trading on market of patents. It is assumed 
that each firm participating in market produces its own technologies, wheress its manufacturing 
sector utilizes both originally produced technologies and those produced in other firms. The firms 
are therefore interdependent through the technology stocks used in manufacturing, which provides a 
basis for the emergence of market of patents. In our model, a firm has three actions in market., prior 
announcement, oflering payofls, and making decisions. Three-stage trading is repeated periodically, 
and thus, drives the evolution of the firms’ technology stocks. We show that, under reasonable 
assumptions, the proposed pattern allows the firms to set so that, first, their individual decisions are 
subjectively best in every period of trading, and second, current combinations of their technology 
stocks gradually approach a state which maximizes the total profit of the firms’ community. An 
important feature of the mode1 is that the described market operations imply the minimum exchange 
in individual information. @ 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The absorption and utilization of externally produced knowledge, which is often referred to as the 
spillover phenomenon, is widely viewed as a key factor in the technological development. Endoge- 
nous growth theory provides a global analytical approach to treating the impact of technology 
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spillovers on long-run growth performance (see, e.g., [l]). This approach refers primarily to such 
large-scale and complex knowledge-producing units as countries. The analysis of the extremal 
case, where each country is assumed to have immediate, complete, and costless access to the 
technology stocks of other countries [l], was supplemented by studies on two-country patterns 
characterized by unilateral and bilateral flows of knowledge [2,3]. In these studies, the country’s 
ability to assimilate knowledge is measured by the so-called absorptive capacity, a variable index 
positively related to the country’s accumulated technology stock. 
The absorptive capacity (or the assimilation capacity) represents the aggregate result of work of 
mechanisms of distinguishing profitable knowledge, internalizing it and embodying it to the pro- 
duction process (see [4]). At the countries’ level, it would be difficult to capture such mechanisms 
in a mathematical model without losing its analytical tractability. Mechanisms of knowledge as- 
similation become clearer at the level of firms. In this paper, we focus on a particular mechanism 
of knowledge exchange in a community of firms. We construct and analyze a dynamic model of 
market of patents. 
Fair trading on market and selling and buying patents for new technologies may organize 
well-structured flows of knowledge. The market mechanism can, therefore, be viewed as a key 
candidate for determining the inter-firms technology exchange in the future. In our model, the 
firms’ behavior on market of patents has three stages, prior announcement, offering payoffs, and 
making decisions. At the first stage, each firm announces a relatively small portion of its new 
technologies (without producing them). At the second stage, each firm studies the announced 
technologies of other firms and offers its payoffs for these technologies. At the third stage, each 
firm analyzes the total payoff offer of other firms and makes its decision on producing and selling 
or not producing (and not selling) its announced technologies. The three-stage procedure is 
repeated periodically and, thus, drives the evolution of the firms’ technology stocks. Our goal is 
to show that the proposed pattern is flexible enough to let the firms produce and sell new portions 
of technologies in such a way that, first, the individual decisions are best for every firm in every 
period, and second, the current combination of firms’ technology stocks eventually approaches 
a state, which maximizes the total profit of the firms’ community. An important feature of 
the discussed model is that the associated market operations imply the minimum exchange in 
information on firms’ individual key characteristics such as the production functions, the costs for 
producing and maintaining technologies, and the structure of the technology stocks accumulated 
in manufacturing. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a model of a community of firms. 
A key feature of the model is that each firm utilizes technologies produced in all other firms. 
This provides a ground for the emergence of market of patents, on which the firms trade on 
payoffs for their new technologies. A model of round-by-round trading on market of patents is 
presented in Section 3. We describe an intuitively clear rule for making individual decisions in one 
round (we call them boundedly rational decisions) and justify their optimality for every firm in 
every round. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of the global evolution of the technology stocks 
driven by boundedly rational market decision makers. In particular, we state that the area of low 
technology stocks (which is covered in an initial period of the evolution) is very favourable for 
the technological development and operations on market of patents. In this area, all boundedly 
rational firms never interrupt the production of new technologies, and all patents are sold on 
market. Our main result, which closes the section, states that the boundedly rational decision 
makers drive their technology stocks to a state, which maximizes the total profit of the firms’ 
community. In other words, the firms behaving boundedly rational in every round eventually 
find a combination of their technologies, which is best for their community as a whole. Section 5 
presents conclusions. 
We conclude our introduction with a short characterization of our methodology. In our setting, 
the firms operate in the situation where their profits depend on the technologies developed in other 
firms. This falls entirely into the scope of theory of noncooperative games (see [5-71). To char- 
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acterize the combinations of firms’ technologies, which may be acceptable for their community, 
we refer to the notion of a Pareto equilibrium. Among the Pareto equilibria, we select the one, 
which maximizes the total profit of the firms’ community, and thus, represents the best combina- 
tion of firms’ technologies. This combination can, obviously, be viewed as a target of the firms’ 
community as a whole. However, the immediate switch to the target of all firms simultaneously 
is not possible thanks to the informational barriers. To make a cooperative decision on a radical 
switch to the target the firms must communicate to each other their production functions, their 
costs for producing and maintaining technologies, and the structure of their technology stocks. 
This total exchange in private information is hardly imaginable; moreover, the firms may not be 
able to reconstruct instantaneously the global shape of their own production and cost functions. 
Instead of a radical switch, slow evolutionary paths towards the target should be studied. This 
view is in good agreement with theory of repeated games which assumes interacting agents to 
learn in an infinite sequence of rounds (see [8-121). In this context, we state that boundedly 
rational firms, which gradually approach the target through market of patents, learn successfully. 
2. FIRMS: STATIC RELATIONS 
2.1. Production Functions 
Let us assume that n firms, numbered 1,. . . ,n, operate on market. Following the classical 
approach [13-151, we assume that production of each firm i, yi, is a function of labour, capital, 
materials, energy, and the technology stock accumulated in the manufacturing sector; as usual, 
we call this function the production function. We assume that, given a size of the accumulated 
technology stock, Ei, particular amounts of labour, capital, materials, and energy are required. 
These amounts are, therefore, functions of [i. Substituting them into the production function, 
we represent production, yi, as a function of ci only 
Yi = fi(Ei). (2-l) 
The function fi will also be called the production function of firm i; we assume fi to be mono- 
tonically increasing. 
2.2. Exchange in Technologies 
We assume that each firm i works on new technologies, and the technology stock used in its 
manufacturing sector, &, comprises technologies developed in other firms. Thus, <i = oiizr + 
. . . + ainxn, where zj is the stock of the technologies developed in firm j. The coefficient oij 
located between 0 and 1 represents the fraction of the technology stock developed in firm j, which 
is used in firm i. Generally, oij may depend on the size and structure of the firms’ technology 
stocks. Here, for simplicity, we assume that oij are constant. Substituting [i = oirzr +. e - +ainx, 
into (2.1), we represent production, yi, of firm i ss a function of the technology stocks developed 
in firms l,...,n 
yi = fi(ailXl + “. + C&X,). (2.2) 
2.3. Profits 
Let q = a be the cost for producing and maintaining the technology stock zi in firm i; 
the function q is monotonically increasing. We assume for simplicity that the whole output, yi, 
of firm i is sold on market for the unit price. Then the profit of firm i is given by Ui = yi - ci. 
Using (2.2), we represent the profit as a function of the firms’ technology stocks 
ui = Ui(X1 , . . . ,X,) = fi(UilX1 + ‘. . + UinXn) - Ci(Xi). (2.3) 
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2.4. Technology Game 
Each firm, i, desires to maximize its profit, ui. However, the firm’s profit depends on the 
technology stocks developed in other firms (see (2.3)). Therefore, an actual combination of the 
firms’ technology stocks, (21,. . . , z,), may not be satisfactory for all firms, and some firms may 
wish to change it. This situation falls into the scope of game theory (see, e.g., [6]). Following 
the theory, we consider the set of all hypothetically admissible combinations of firms’ technology 
stocks, (x1,. . . , xn), and define combinations, which are acceptable to the firms’ community 
as a whole. The acceptable combinations represent the Pareto equilibria; we call them Pareto 
equilibrium combinations of technology stocks. 
The definition is as follows. A combination of the technology stocks, (&, . . . , in), is said to be 
Pareto equilibrium if there is no other combination of those, (21, . . . , zn), which is more preferable 
to the firms’ community in the following sense: if all the firms pass (virtually) from (21, . . . , i&) 
to (x1,..., zn), at least one of them wins in profit, that is, ui(zr,. . . ,z,) > ui(Zl,. . . ,fn) for 
some i, whereas all the others do not lose, that is, Uj(zr, . . . ,z,) 1 uj(&, . . . ,&) for all j # i. 
So, every combination (~1,. . . , 2,) differing from the Pareto equilibrium (21,. . . , &) is either 
not better than (21,. . . , 2,) for all firms, that is, ~j(zr,. . . ,s,) 5 q(i1,. . . , i&) for all j, or it 
is strictly worse than (21,. . . ,&) for at least one firm, that is, u~(zI,. . . ,zn) < ui(&, . . . ,&) 
for some i. 
It is remarkable that every maximizer of the weighted sum of the firms’ profits, 
U(Zl,..., 2,) =~1211(51,...,2,)+...+Cln~1,(51,...,Zn), 
where pr,...,~,, are arbitrary positive weight coefficients, is a Pareto equilibrium. The case 
where ~1 = . . . = pn = 1 is of special interest. In this case, the weighted sum represents the total 
profit of the firm’s community, 
@l,..., TcCn)=u1(21 )‘..) z,)+*~~+u,(zl)...) z,). (2.4) 
For the firms’ community as a whole, Pareto equilibria which maximize the total profit (2.4) are 
obviously the best combinations of technology stocks. 
3. DYNAMIC MARKET OF PATENTS 
3.1. Dynamics of Technology Stocks 
Let us introduce dynamics in our model. For simplicity, we discretize time. Namely, we fix an 
infinite sequence of instants, tk, k = 0, 1,2,. . . , and study changes between them. We set to = 0 
and assume that instants tk appear with a fixed (small) positive step 6: tk+l = tk + 6. The 
technology stock of firm i at time tk will be denoted xi. k Note that x$ is the actual technology 
stock at time tk, that is, x” is actually used in manufacturing at time tk. 
We assume that in period k located between tl, and tk+r each firm i introduces $6 new 
technologies and its $5 old technologies are washed off from manufacturing. Therefore, 
a”~. = ,!+I - x; = (r” - r,“-) 6. 2 (3.1) 
Note that the size of the new portion of technologies, r”S, is controlled by firm i, whereas the 
size of old technologies washed off from manufacturing, $-6, is determined by the production 
process. In period k, production of firm i changes from y” = fi(airxf + . . . + ai,z:) to y:+’ = 
fi(Qzr k+r + . . . + a. xk+l m n ), and therefore, grows for 
A”yi = _fi (Uzi~Xf+~ +.**+Ui,XE") -fi (&1X: + .** i-&,x:) 
= f'(ailxf + ... +Q~X~)(U~IA~X~ + ... +cz~~A~x,) +0(S) 
= j'(tZilXf + "' +&,Xk) [&I (rt -T:-) + '.'+Ui, (Ti -Tk-)]S+O(6); 
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here and in what, follows o(6) stands for a small value which tends to 0 faster than 6 (o(6) is 
second order in 6), and f,! is the derivative of fi (we assume that fi is differentiable). The cost 
for technologies in firm i changes from ci($) to Q(z~+‘) and grows for 
Akci = pi (z”“) - pi (Xf) = C: (Xf) (Tf - T”-) S + O(6), 
where ci is the derivative of ci (we assume that c+ is differentiable). Therefore, in period k the 
profit of firm i grows for 
= f’ (ails: + . . . + ai,zffJ [ail (7+ - 7f) + . . . + ai, (7-k - $)] 6 
- c’i (z$) (r” - $-) b + o(6). 
The above formulas describe the firms’ dynamics. The dynamics is controlled by Tf , . . . , T:, the 
rates of new technology inputs in firms 1, . . . , n. 
3.2. Market of Patents. Boundedly Rational Decisions 
Our goal is to show that market of patents can make the firms choose new portions of tech- 
nologies, ~“6, in such a way that, first, the choices are profitable in each period k and, second, 
the current combination of technology stocks, (xt, . . . , xi), eventually approaches the Pareto 
equilibrium (21,. . . , fin), which maximizes the total profit of the firms’ community (see (2.4)). 
In our setting, the firms’ behavior on market of patents in period k has three stages, prior 
announcement, offering payoffs, and making decisions. At the first, stage, each firm announces its 
new technologies (without producing them). At the second stage, each firm studies the announced 
technologies of other firms and offers its payoffs for these technologies. At the third stage, each 
firm analyzes the total payoff offer of other firms and makes its decision on producing and selling 
or not producing (and not selling) its announced technologies. The three-stage procedure is 
repeated in each period k and drives the evolution of the firms’ technology stocks. 
Let, us describe the firms’ behavior in period k in detail. Each firm i starts period k with the 
announcement of its new technologies of a relatively small size $+6, which is, however, greater 
than T!-6. Every other firm, j, examines the announced technologies of firm i and offers to 
firm i its payoff, qii, for those technologies (among the announced ones) which will be used in 
the manufacturing sector of firm j. Now we argue for firm j. By assumption, fraction aji of 
the technologies produced in firm i is used in firm j. Therefore, firm j is interested in ajir:+6 
announced technologies of firm i. The incorporation of these technologies in the manufacturing 
sector of firm j yields production growth of size 
= _fj (CZjlXF + ‘. . + aj,Xz) Uji (T”’ - TF-) 6 + O(b). 
Firm j decides how much to pay to firm i for its aj,rt+b new technologies. Firm j has all reasons 
to view A”+yjo as an upper bound for its payoff, qFii, to firm i. Generally, firm j would offer 
to firm i some qti smaller than Ak+yj/ji. However, the difference between q$ and Ak’yji can be 
small compared to their absolute values. The more “fairly” firm j operates, the smaller is the 
difference. Here we restrict our analysis to extremely fair behaviors. Thus, we assume that the 
payoff offered by firm j to firm i is 
(we neglect o(b)). 
(3.2) 
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Let us come back to firm i. Its own production growth due to its new technologies is given by 
qi = fj’ (ajlz: +. . * + aj,sg aii (rf+ - 7-f) b 
(again, o(6) is neglected). Firm i finds the total payoff offer, q,k, for the announced new technolo- 
gies as the sum of the payoffs offered by all other firms and its own income due to production 
growth, qk 
Next, firm i computes its expenditure for developing and maintaining 
nologies as the cost increment 
A’“+c, = c, (x” + (r-Z”+ - r”-) 6) - ci (x;) . 
Neglecting o(6), we represent this as 
p; = c; (x”) (7-f’ -7-f) 6. 
(3.3) 
the announced new tech- 
(3.4) 
Finally, firm i compares the payoff offer, qf, and the expenditure, p”. If the payoff offer is not 
smaller than the expenditure, qf 2 pf, firm i produces the announced technologies of size r”+6, 
that is, sets r” = rf+ (see (3.1)), and sells its patents to all other firms; in this case every firm j 
pays q$ to firm i for patents for ajir, '+b technologies. If the payoff offer to firm i is smaller than 
the expenditure, qf < p”, firm i does not produce the announced technologies in period k; it sets 
r” = 0 (see (3.1)). This closes period k. We call the above decisions of firm i boundedly rational. 
The decision making rule for finding boundedly rational decisions is, therefore, 
r” = 1 r++ 0: , ifq$>pk, if qf <pf. (3.5) 
3.3. Optimality of Boundedly Rational Decisions 
Now we will show that the boundedly rational decisions are in fact the best in every period k 
(in our argument we neglect the second-order terms o(S)). 
Let us decide for firm i, which of the two options is better in period k: 
(i) to produce and sell the announced rf+b technologies, or 
(ii) not to produce (and not to sell) them. 
In terms of the transition formula (3.1), Options (i) and (ii) prescribe r” = r-f’ and 7-F = 0, 
respectively. 
Recall that as the firms make their decisions in period k, the firms’ community is spilt in the 
two groups, the group of those that produce and sell the announced technologies (sell firms) and 
the group of those that do not produce (and do not sell) the announced technologies (not-sell 
fims). Every sell firm j sells patents for its &jr:(&)6 technologies to firm i. The implementation 
of these technologies brings firm i the income 
9: = f’ (ail+ + . . + ain5E) aij (rj k+ -rF-)S 
due to production growth (see (3.2) with z and j exchanged). This income equals the payoff of 
firm i to firm j. Hence, every operation with a sell firm brings firm i the income 0. 
Every not-sell firm j does not sell its new technologies to firm i, which implies the production 
loss of size 
lfj = f’ (uii2f + . . + ain2k) aijrf-6 
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in firm i. The total loss of firm i due to the lack of new technologies of the not-sell firms is given 
1” (J!) = c 1;; (3.6) 
j&r; 
here Jt is the set of all not-sell firms in period. k with the exception of firm i, and CjeJb denotes 
summation over all j from J!. 
1 
Now consider i as a potential seller. Recall that every firm j offers firm i payoff q$$ for its 
announced technologies of size aijr,k’d. Hence, 
k 
-k 
4ji = 
4ji 
f-J ..rk+d 
3% z 
is the price set by firm j for a new technology unit of firm i. Therefore, 
is the payoff of firm j for oji$6 technologies of firm i. Similarly, we find that qz$/rf+ is 
the income of firm i through the implementation of its own o&6 technologies, and p$:/rf+ 
(see (3.4)) is its cost for producing and maintaining rfb new technologies. The income gained by 
firm i through producing, selling, and implementing r:6 technologies is, therefore, 
(see (3.3)). Distracting the loss 1f(.Jf) (3.6), we find the total income, Q~(r~,J~), of firm i in 
period k 
Q: (r,“, Jf) = $$$ - 1” (Jf) . (3.7) 
E 
Recall that firm i must choose between r-t = r,“’ (Option (i)) a nd r” = 0 (Option (ii)). The best 
choice for firm i is, obviously, the one which provides a higher value to Qk(rk, J!). Substituting 
r-h = r:’ and r; = 0 in (3.7), we get t 
Q; (T;+, Jf) = (qf - pf) - 1” (J;) , 
Qf (0, Jf) = -1” (J:) . 
Consequently, if qf - p,” > 0, the best choice for firm i is r$ = rt’ (Option (i)), and if 
qt - pt < 0, the best choice for firm i is r” = 0 (Option (ii)). If qf - p! = 0, both choices yield 
Q;(rf, Ji”)) = -l$(J/), in this case they are equivalent for firm i. Thus, the bounded rationality 
decision making rule (3.5), which prescribes firm i to choose (i) if qf - pf 2 0 and (ii) otherwise, 
is the best for firm i in period k. 
3.4. Robustness and Multioptimality of Boundedly Rational Decisions 
The boundedly rational (the best) decisions of firm i are robust with respect to the decisions 
of other firms. Namely, the boundedly rational decisions of firm i do not depend on the decisions 
of other firms on selling or not selling their announced technologies in period k, although the 
income of firm i in this period, Q:(rt, .7!) (3.7), depends on the decisions of other firms through 
Jf (the set of all not-sell firms in period k with the exception of firm i). 
The above robustness property can also be interpreted as multioptirna&y. To make this in- 
terpretation clear, let us replace Jf in (3.7) (and in (3.6)) by an arbitrary subgroup, J, of firms 
986 A. KRYAZHIMSKII AND C. WATANABE 
l,...,i - 1,i + l,...,n. “Free” J has a very clear meaning. When firm i does not know the 
actual decisions of other firms, it has to view all J as equally admissible candidates for being the 
actual not-sell group in period k. Thus, we make firm i deal with the family of tirt~al incomes 
(34 
depending on an uncertain set J. For any J, firm i can find its best response to J, that is, its best 
decision under the hypothesis that J is the actual not-sell group. The best response of firm i is 
given by r” which solves the next maximization problem 
maximize Q: (r:, J) over T-” E {T!+, 0} ; (3.9) 
here r” E {rF+ ,O} indicates that r” is restricted to the two-element set with elements r:’ 
and 0. We see that the boundedly rational decision, which is made by firm i irrespective of J, 
responds best to any J. This decision is multioptimal in the sense that it solves simultaneously 
all maximization problems (3.9) parameterized by J. 
3.5. Local Game. Nash Equilibrium of Boundedly Rational Decisions 
Let us represent the virtual income Qf($, J) as an explicit function of the firms’ choices 
r:,... ,$. Note that fixing J is the same as assuming that all j from J choose r; = 0 and all j 
not belonging to J choose r; = ri’. Then, introducing 
Xfj (?-fj) = 
i 
1, if$=O, 
0, if rk = r!+ 3 3 ’ 
we represent Q$(rk, J) (3.8) as 
This representation shows that the firms-each maximizing its income-act as players in an n- 
person game. In this local game rf E {rF+, 0) is the admis sible action of player (firm) i and 
Q?(r!, . . . , $) is the payoff to this player. 
The multioptimality of the boundedly rational decisions implies that in the local game the 
boundedly rational decision (3.5) of any firm i responds best to arbitrary combination, (T-f, . . . ,&, 
$++l,.. . , T-;), of admissible actions of other firms. In other words, no matter how T$ for j # i are 
chosen, the boundedly rational decision of firm i maximizes Qf(rt, . . . , r:) over r”. 
In particular, the boundedly rational decision of each firm responds best to the boundedly 
rational decisions of all other firms. This property characterizes the entire combination of the 
firm’s boundedly rational decisions as a Nash equilibrium in the local game in period k (see, 
e.g., 171). 
3.6. Informational Aspect 
Every firm is, obviously, interested in not spreading information about its key characteristics 
such as the production function, the costs for producing and maintaining technologies, and the 
structure of the technology stock accumulated in manufacturing. In the context of our model, each 
firm i views functions fi and ci, the technology stock &, and the coefficients oij characterizing the 
structure of & as its private information. The technological evolution and exchange in technologies 
via market of patents should imply the minimum exchange in private information. 
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Market of patents with boundedly rational decision makers meets this condition entirely. In- 
deed, in period k every two boundedly rational firms, i and j, communicate three times. First 
time, they announce each other their new technologies. Second time, they exchange with their 
payoff offers. Third time, they sell each other patents for new technologies (at this stage, one of 
the firms, or both of them, may decide not to sell the patents). At the first and third stages there 
is no information exchange between the firms. The most informative stage is offering payoffs. At 
this stage firm j indicates to firm i the required part, ajiTf+d, of the announced rf+6 technolo- 
gies. Thus, implicitly, the structural coefficient aji is communicated to firm i. Recall that the 
payoff offer of, firm j to firm i, qti, is given by (3.2). Using this formula and knowing qji and oji, 
firm i is able to identify fi ($), the derivative of the production function of firm j (marginal 
productivity of firm j) at the currently accumulated technology stock $ = ojrzt + . . . + ajnzi. 
This, obviously, does not give to firm i any information on the global shape of function fj, the 
size of the currently accumulated technology stock $, and the structural coefficients ojs for s # i. 
Similar signals go from firm i to firm j. The exchange in information is, evidently, minimal. 
4. ANALYSIS OF MARKET TRAJECTORIES 
4.1. Assumptions and Definitions 
In the previous section, we showed that the firms’ boundedly rational decisions, T!, . . . , T;, are 
the best with respect to the firms’ current interests in any period k. Our main goal in this section 
is to show that the boundedly rational decisions drive the collection of the firms’ technology stocks, 
(z!, . . . ,xk), to the state (21,. . . , ct,), which is the best for the firms’ community as a whole; 
namely, (21,. . . , &) is the Pareto equilibrium, which maximizes the total profit of the firms’ 
community (see (2.4)). A strict formulation of this key property will be given in Proposition 
4.4 which will close our analysis. The existence and uniqueness of (21,. . . , i&) maximizing the 
total profit will be stated in Proposition 4.3. The domain of attraction of boundedly rational 
trajectories and their behavior in the area of low technology stocks (covered in an initial interval 
of the evolution) will be characterized in Propositions 4.1 and 4.2. 
In our analysis, we use several assumptions. 
We assume that production of firm i, fi(C,i)y grows with the technology stock &, and its growth 
rate, f,!([i), declines as Ei grows. SO, the higher is the level of the accumulated technology stock, 
the smaller is the production increment gained through the implementation of a new technology 
unit. 
We also assume that the cost of firm i for producing and maintaining xi technologies, ci(zi), 
grows with xi and its growth rate, ci(zi), infinitely grows as [i grows. Thus, the higher is the 
level of the active firm’s technology stock, the higher is its cost for producing and maintaining a 
new technology unit; moreover, the latter cost approaches infinity at extremely high levels of the 
technology stock and vanishes at the origin. 
Let us give more accurate formulations of the assumptions. We assume that for every i = 
1 ,..., n function fi is defined and twice continuously differentiable on the nonnegative half- 
interval [0, oo), strictly increasing, that is, f,!(<i) > 0 for all & > 0, and strictly concave, that is, 
f,!‘(C) < 0 for all & 1 0. Here and in what follows the right derivative is considered at the origin. 
We assume that for every i = 1,. . . , n function ci is defined and twice continuously differentiable 
on the nonnegative half-interval [0, OO), strictly increasing, that is, ci(zi) > 0 for all Ei > 0, strictly 
convex, that is, c;(C) L 0 for all <i 1 0, and, finally, has the zero growth rate at the origin and 
infinite growth rate at infinity, that is, 
c:(o) = 0, (4.1) 
lim ci(Zi) = co. 
5,+00 
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We assume 0 5 aij 5 1 for all i,j = 1,. . . , n and aii > 0 for ail i = 1,. . . , n (the latter 
assumption says that each firm utilizes a nonzero fraction of self-produced technologies). 
Now we introduce constraints on the maximum rates of the firms’ technology inputs, r:+, and 
the rates of technology outflows, rf- (see Section 1). Namely, we assume that for every collection 
of technology stocks in period Ic, (xt, . . . , xi), where xf, . . . ,xE > 0, and every i = 1,. . . , n, we 
have 
p++ (x”) 2 r,“’ 1 p’- (xf) , (4.3) 
pi+ (x”) 2 rf- 1 pi- (x”) > 0, (4.4) 
p’- (xf) > pi+ (xf) ) (4.5) 
xf > p+- (x”) ) (4.6) 
where p’+, pr-, pi+, pi- are given nonnegative continuous functions defined on the half-axis 
IO, 00). 
In what follows, (xy, . . . ,x8) is an arbitrary initial combination of the firms’ technology stocks, 
xy,..., x; > 0. 
Note that assumption (4.6) implies that every sequence (x!, . . . ,x$, Ic = 0, 1, . . , of firms’ 
technology stocks, which develops under the general transition formula (3.1) with arbitrary r” 2 0 
(i = 1 , . . . , n), satisfies the natural constraints x:, . . . , xk > 0, or, in other words, never abandons 
the positive orthant O+; the latter is by definition the collection of all (xi,. . . ,x,) such that 
xl,...,xn. >o. 
Let a sequence (xt, . . . , xk), Ic = 0, 1, . . . , of firms’ technology stocks be driven by the boundedly 
rational decisions, that is, for each i = 1,. . . , n and each k = 0, 1, . . . , the following conditions 
hold: 
‘+’ (i) x,” and xi , t he technology stocks of firm i in periods k and k + 1, satisfy the transition 
formula (3.1), 
(ii) rk, the decision of firm i in period k, is determined by the bounded rationality decision 
making rule (3.5), 
(iii) r,“’ and T!-, the maximum rate of the technology input and the rate of the technology 
outflow of firm i in period Ic, satisfy constraints (4.3) and (4.4), 
(iv) I$, the total payoff offer to firm i in period k, is given by (3.3),(3.2), and 
(v) p$, the expenditure of firm i in period k, is given by (3.4). 
Wecalltheabovesequence(xf ,..., xi), k=0,1,2 ,..., a boundedly rational trajectory of the 
technology stocks on market of patents. 
Note that a boundedly rational trajectory is, generally, not unique, although the bounded 
rationality decision making rule (3.5) is well determined. The reason is that the maximum 
inflow rate r”+ and the outflow rate r”- are determined not uniquely; they may take arbitrary 
values between p’-(xt) and p”(xf), and between pi-(x!) and pi+, respectively (see (4.3) 
and (4.4)). 
4.2. Domain of Attraction 
All boundedly rational trajectories have a common domain of attraction, A, which is bounded 
and strictly separated from the origin. The domain A can be defined as the collection of all 
(x1,. . . ,x,) such that K 5 xi 5 K (i = 1,. . . ,n) for some IC > 0 and K > K. In standard 
mathematical notations, 
A = {(x1,. . . ,xn):~<xi<K(i=l ,..., n)}. (4.7) 
The attraction property of A is interpreted as follows: every boundedly rational trajectory enters 
A in some finite period and then circulates in A. Thus, if market of patents is boundedly rational, 
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then the technology stock of each firm can neither stay below K. forever, nor become lower than K. 
after visiting the region above K; similarly, it can neither stay above K forever, nor become higher 
than K after visiting the region below K. 
Let us give the accurate formulation. 
PROPOSITION 4.1. There exist IC > 0 and K > IC such that the set A given by (4.7) is the domain 
of attraction for the boundedly rational trajectories of the technology stocks in the following 
sense: if the time step 6 is sufficiently small, then for every boundedly rational trajectory of the 
technology stocks, (x!, . . . ,zE~), k = O,l, . . . , there is period k, such that (XI,. . . ,z$) lies in A 
for all k 2 k,. 
The proposition is proved in the Appendix. 
4.3. Evolution in the Area of Low Technology Stocks 
Our model shows that the area of low technology stocks (which is covered in an initial period 
of the evolution) is very favourable for the technological development and operations on market 
of patents. In this area, all boundedly rational firms never interrupt the production of new 
technologies, and all patents are sold on market. 
Here is the exact formulation. 
PROPOSITION 4.2. There exists c > 0 such that for every boundedly rational trajectory of the 
technology stocks, (xc:, . . . ,x2), k = 0, 1, . . . , and every period k, for which xy, .. . , xz 5 CT, the 
k’ boundedly rational decision r” (3.5) of any firm i is ri ( firm i develops and sells patents for 
#+b new technologies). 2 
A proof is given in the Appendix. 
4.4. Convergence to the Best Pareto Equilibrium 
Now we consider the firms’ total profit function, U, given by (2.4). 
PROPOSITION 4.3. The total profit function ‘1~ (2.4) has the unique maximizer, (?I,. . . ,i&), in 
the positive orthant O+. 
As noted in Section 1, (?I,. . . , &) is a Pareto equilibrium. 
Our main, and final, result says that if the time step S is sufficiently small, then every boundedly 
rational trajectory enters an arbitrarily small neighborhood of (21, . . . ,5&) in a finite period and 
stays there forever. Thus, the boundedly rational firms find the combination of technologies 
which is the best for the firms’ community as a whole and keep their technology stocks close to 
it. 
Here is the accurate formulation. 
PROPOSITION 4.4. For every E > 0 there is 60 > 0 having the following property: if the time 
step 6 is smaller than 60, then for every boundedly rational trajectory of the technology stocks, 
(&. . .,xk), k = O,l,..., there exists period ko such that for all periods k 2 ko and all firms 
i=l , . . . , n it holds that Ix” - $1 < E. 
Propositions 4.3 and 4.4 are proved in the Appendix. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
We presented a dynamic model of a community of firms whose technology stocks overlap. It 
was shown that market of patents allows the firms to organize flows of knowledge in a globally 
optimal and locally rational manner. Namely, market-driven combinations of firms’ technology 
stocks may in the long run approach a point favourable for the firms’ community as a whole, 
whereas in every local market operation the individual decision of every firm agrees with its 
current interest. 
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The presented model is to a considerable extend stylized. The basic simplifying 
are the following: 
(i) the accumulated technology stock of a firm stays in a strict correspondence 
capital, materials, and energy use (Section 1.1); 
(ii) the structural coefficients, uji, are constant (Section 1.2); 
(iii) the whole production is sold and prices are constant (Section 1.3); 
(iv) the prior descriptions of the announced new technologies are complete and 
ideally “fair” (Section 2.2); 
(v) long-term R and D projects are neglected. 
assumptions 
with labour, 
payoff offers 
C$i) > 2 f;(ajlsl + . . . + ajnsn)aji, (A-1) 
j=l 
for all i = 1 , . . . , n, all xi 1 Ko, and all xj > 0, j # i, and 
Ci(Xi) < g $(ujlXl + * * * + ujnXn)uji, (A.3 
j=l 
foralli=l,... , n and all positive xi 5 IEO and xj 5 Ko, j # i. 
PROOF. Take i between 1 and n. Fix a positive q. By assumption fj is decreasing. Then for 
all j, all xi 2 7, and all x8 > 0, s # i, we have 
In this context, one may think about extensions of the presented analysis under reasonably 
weakened Assumptions (i)-(v) as natural further steps in the analytical treatment of market of 
patents. 
APPENDIX 
Here we prove Propositions 4.1-4.4. 
We start with a technical lemma following from the assumptions on functions fi and q. 
LEMMA A.l. There exist a positive K,J and a positive )EO < K such that 
fi (UjlXl + ‘. ’ + UjiXi + . ’ ’ + UjnXn) Uji < fi(UjiXi)Uji 5 fj(UjiQ)Uji. 
Since c: is infinitely increasing (see (4.2)), th ere is Ko 2 r] such that (A.l) holds for all xi 1 KO 
and all xj > 0, j # i. Without loss of generality, we set KO to be the same for all i. 
By assuming f,! is positive, c:(O) = 0 (see (4.1)) and uii > 0. Then there is a positive ICO < KO 
such that 
f,l(u~~Ko +...+uiino +... +u,,Ko)uii > c;(xi), 
for all positive xi 5 IEO and xj 5 K, j # i. Taking into account that fi is decreasing, we get 
2 fi(~llKo + . *. + UiiKO + . . . + U,,Ko)Uii 
> Ci(Xi)v 
for all positive xi 5 no and xj 5 K, j # i. Hence, for all these x1,. . . , xn we have (A.2). Without 
loss of generality we set ~0 to be the same for all i. The lemma is proved. 
Below, we fix constants ICO and KO introduced in Lemma A.l. In what follows (xf, . . . , xk), 
Ic=O,l,..., is an arbitrary boundedly rational trajectory of the technology stocks. Recall that 
bydefinitionforalli=l,..., nandallIc=O,l,..., Conditions (i)-(v) of Section 3.1 are satisfied. 
The next assertion follows easily from Lemma A.l. 
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LEMMA A.2. Foreveryk=O,l,... andeveryi=l,..., n the next statements hold true: 
(i) if xt 1 Ko, then r” = 0, 
(ii) if x5,. . . , xk 5 K. and x” 5 lco, then r” = rf+. 
PROOF. Let x$ 2 Kc. Then by Lemma A.l, (A.l) holds for (xi,. . . ,x,) = (x4,. . . ,xk) 
c; (x”) > 2 $ (ajlxt + . . . + aj,xg aji. 
j=l 
Multiplying by the positive factor (T Ic+ - rk-)6 and using notations (3.2) and (3.4), we represent 
the inequality as pf > qfi +. . . +q$, or, recalling notation (3.3), as qf < ph. The decision making 
rule (3.5) yields r” = 0. 
Let xt,...,xk 5 KO and x” 5 ~0. Then by Lemma A.l, (A.2) holds for (xi, . . . , 2,) = 
(x2, ‘. ., 43 
Multiplying by the positive factor (rk+ - r”-)6 and using notations (3.2)-(3.4), we represent the 
inequality as qf > pt. The decision making rule (3.5) yields r” = T:+. The lemma is proved. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.1. Fix K > KO and a positive K. < ~0 and define A by (4.7). Choose 
R > 0 so that 
R>max{p++(xi):O<xi< K}, 
for all i = l,... ,n. Let the time step b satisfy 
. 
For the boundedly rational trajectory (xt, . . . ,xk), k = 0, 1, . . . , the transition formula (3.1) and 
estimates (4.3),(4.4) yield 
~x~+‘-x~~~~~~-T~-~~~R~<~~~{K-K~,Ic~-~}, (A-3) 
if x” 5 K. Take some i between 1 and n. Assume that xp > K. Choose r > 0 so that 
T I min { pi-(xi) : KO 5 xi 5 x4} ; 
r exists since p-- is continuous and takes positive values at positive arguments (see (4.4)). By 
Lemma A.2(i), rp = 0. Hence, the transition formula (3.1) and estimates (4.4) yield 
x; = xp - rp-f5 5 xp - p-- (x4) 6 5 x; - rb. 
If xt > K, we replace in the previous argument k = 0 sequentially by k = 1,2,. . . , and finally, 
arrive at a finite period ki such that for all k = 0, 1, . . . , ki-1 we have xf+l 5 xf -rS and x” > K, 
and xfi 5 K. If xp 2 K, we set ki = 0. Thus, we stated that there is ki such that 2:’ 5 K. Let 
us show that x$ 5 K for all k > ki. Assume that, to the contrary, xf+’ > K for some k 2 ki. 
With no loss of generality assume xf 5 K. Due to (A.3) 
xk > xe+’ - (K - Ko) 2 K - (K - Ko) = Ko. 2.-- 
Then by Lemma A.2(i), r” = 0, hence, by (3.1) 
x;+’ = x” - T;-6 5 x” 2 K. 
The contradiction with the assumption xk+’ > K proves that x” < K for all k 2 ki. Let k* be 
the maximum of ICI,. . . ,k,. Obviously,wehavexf~Kforalli=l,...,nandallk~k*. 
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Let us show that there is k, 1 k’ such that x” > K for all i = 1,. . . , n and all k 1 k*. This 
will complete the proof. 
Take some i. Assume that x$’ < K. Choose T > 0 so that 
r 5 min $(x:i) - pi+(x:i) : xS* 5 xi 5 Ks 
1 > 
; 
r exists since p+- and p-+ are continuous and their difference is positive at positive arguments 
(see (4.5). By Lemma A.S(ii), rf’ = r:*+. H ence, the transition formula (3.1) and estimates (4.4) 
yield 
xf l +l = x:* + ( $*+ - rf’- > b>xy+(p-+(x:‘)-p-+(xf*))S>x4+rJ. 
If xf’+’ < K, we replace in the previous argument k = k* sequentially by k = 1,2,. . . , and finally, 
arrive at a finite period si such that for all k = k’, k* + 1, . . . , si - 1 we have xf+l 2 x” + rS 
and xf < K, and xi’ > K. If x”’ 2 K, we set si = k*. Thus, we stated that there is si such 
that xi’ 2 n. Let us show that for each k 2 si we have x” 2 K. Assume that, to the contrary, 
xt+l < IC for all i = 1 , . . . , n and some k 2 si. With no loss of generality assume xt 2 K. Due 
to (A.3) 
x6 < x:+1 - (Kg - K) I K - (Kc - K) = Kc. 2- 
Then by Lemma A.P(ii), r” = r:+, hence, by (3.1) 
The contradiction with the assumption xk+’ < IC proves that x” 1 K for all k 2 si. Let k, be 
themaximumofsi,...,~,. Obviously, we have x” 2 K for all i = 1,. . . , n and all k 2 k,. The 
proposition is proved. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.2. Set CT = IEO. Now the proposition follows from Lemma A.2(ii). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.3. By (2.4) and (2.3), 
84X1,. . .1X,) 
aXi 
= 2 f&JjlXl + ’ ’ ’ + ajnX,)Uji - Cl(Xi). 
j=l 
(A.4) 
By Lemma A.1 for all xi, . . . , x, 2 KO and all i = 1, . . . , n inequality (A.l) holds. 
au’%;;‘“” 
Hence, 
< 0 for all 2 I,..., x,>Kcandalli=l,..., n. Consequently,foreveryxi ,..., x,> 
KO there are nonnegative Zi , . . . , f, 5 KO such that ~(31,. . . ,&,) > ~(21,. . . ,x:,). Therefore, u 
has a maximizer, (xi,. . . ,2,), in the set of all xi,. . . ,x, 2 0, and, moreover xi,. . . , & 5 Ko. 
Since u is strictly concave, the maximizer is unique. It remains to show that xi,. . . ,xn > 0. 
Assume that, to the contrary, xi = 0 for some i. Then by (4.1) and (A.4) 
Hence, for a sufficiently small E > 0 
21(~l,...,~i+E,...,~~)=2L(~l,..., 2i ,..., in)+ 
au(&,...,&) 
aXi 
E + O(&) 
>U(&,...,k,), 
which is not possible since (xi , . . . , Pn) is the maximizer for U. The proposition is proved. 
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.4. Below, we consider only Ic 2 Ic,, for which (zf, . . . , z$) lies in the 
domain A (see Proposition 4.1). Let us show that ZL(X~, . . ,z$) (2.4) increases as k 1 k, grows. 
Using (3.1), we get 
u (x:+1,. . . , xi+1 ) - u (xf,. . . ,x;> = 2 au cx\;;. 3x3(xk+l - x2) + o”(6) 
i=l 
++;;..-:, (,;_,~-)~+olc(q; 
(A.5) 
i=l 
z 
the fact that (zf,. . . , xf) lies in the bounded domain A together with the continuous differentia- 
bility of 21, imply that o”(b) is second order in 6 uniformly with respect to k; namely, for arbitrary 
p > 0 we have 
P>F 1o”(cq I CL6 (A.6) 
- l 
provided 6 is sufficiently small. According to (A.4) and notations (3.2)-(3.4), 
au (xf , . . . ) xi) k 
dXi 
(Q - ?-F-) 6 = qf - pt. 
Since (rp - r,“-)S > 0, the sign of y coincides with the sign of qf - pt. Hence, the 
decision making rule (3.5) prescribes 
and we get 
Substituting in (A.5), we find 
au(x~,...,x;) 
dXi 
Irk+ - r,“-I 6, if 
du (xf, . . . ) xi) 
aXi 
I$-] 6, if 
au (xc:, . . , x;> 
i3Xi 
au(x:,...,xg 
8Xi 
2 0, 
< 0. 
where 
<t = min { I$+ -$-I, 1$-I}. 
Choose rr > 0 and r2 > 0 so that 
r1 5 min{d-(xi) - p;+(xi) : K 5 xi 5 K} , 
r2 I min {pi-(Xi) : K. 2 xi 2 K} , 
for all i = 1, . . . , n; ~1 and r2 exist since p-- and (p+- - p-+) are continuous and take positive 
values at positive arguments (see (4.4) and (4.5)). Then @ 2 r = min{rr,r2}, and we have 
u (x:+1,. . . ,x:+1> - u (xf, . . 
n au(x:,...,xg 
.d>2): ax ?-6 + o”(6). 
i=l 2 
(A.7) 
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This estimate shows that if 6 is sufficiently small, then, in a region where not all partial derivatives 
of u are close to zero, the growth rate of u(z~, . . . , xi) is bounded from below by a positive 
constant. The region, in which all partial derivatives of u are close to zero, is located in a 
neighborhood of (&, . . . , i&), the maximizer of u. Since u(z:, . . . ,zi) cannot grow to infinity, it 
must approach (?I, . . . , &). 
This is the logical pattern of the rest of our proof. Now we argue accurately. 
The continuous function u is bounded on the bounded domain A. Therefore, there is M > 0 
such that 
Iu (&. . +Cf)l I M, 64.8) 
for all k 2 k,. For any y > 0 let AY+ denote the set of all (zt , . . . , zk) from A such that 
and A; denote its complement in A, that is, the set of all (xf, . . . , xk) from A such that 
n aU(x:,...,x;) cl OXi 5 Y. i=l 
Take an arbitrarily small y > 0. Let us show that if 6 is small enough, then there is k- 2 k, 
such that (xy-, . . . , xi-) lies in A;. We choose b so small that (A.6) holds with ~1 = r/2. If 
(x:.,.. . , x2) lies in A;, we set k- = k,. Assume that (xc:*, . . . , z$ ) does not lie in A;, that is, 
belongs to A:. Suppose that the desired k- does not exist. Then (xt, . . . ,x$ lies in AY+ for all 
k > k,. Hence, by (A.7) 
u (xf+l,. . . ,xk+l) - u (cc:, . . . , z$) 1 rdy + o(b) > 7, 
for all k 21 k,. Then 
iirn, u (x:+i, . . . , xk+l) = co, 
+ 
which contradicts (A.8). The contradiction shows that there is k- 2 k, such that (x:, . . . , xk) lies 
in A;. By Proposition 4.3 (21,. . . , 2,) is the unique maximizer of u in the positive orthant O+. 
This fact and the strict concavity of u imply that the point (21, . . . ,5&) is uniquely determined 
by the condition that at this point all partial derivatives of u vanish. Hence, choosing arbitrary 
u > 0, we find that if y > 0 is small enough, the set A; is contained in the v-neighborhood of 
(ii,... , in). We assume that y is chosen this way in advance. The choice of u will be specified 
in the next paragraph. 
Denote ti = (21,. . . ,&). Take arbitrary E > 0. The strict concavity of u implies that 
there exists cu > 0 such that all (xi,. . . ,x,), for which ~(21,. . .,x,) 2 fi - a, lie in the E- 
neighborhood of (21, . . . , &). We assume that v is so small that for all (xi,. . . ,x,) from the 
u-neighborhood of (21,. . . ,i&) the inequality u(xi, . . . ,x,) 2 u - c~/2 holds. In particular, we 
have u(c$, . . . ,x2-) 1 ii - a/2. 
Now we will show that b can be chosen so small that 
u(x!,..., x;> L G - QI, (A.8) 
for all k > k-. Then by the definition of a we will have (xt, . . . , xk) in the s-neighborhood of 
(51,. . , 2,) for all k 2 k-, which will complete the proof. 
Since the partial derivatives of u are uniformly continuous on A, for sufficiently small 6 we 
have 
n 
c(l i=l a+: 7.e.7 43 _ au(xi).;.,x:) axi I 1 I 1) < ;, (A.lO) 
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for all k 2 k,. Let 6 satisfy this constraint. Since (21,. . . , in) is the unique maximizer of U, there 
is w > 0 such that all (~1,. . . ,z,) satisfying u(z~, . . . ,x,) < C - a lie in A,, + that is, 
cl 
7L d4Xl,...,Xn) >w 
2=1 
f3Xi 
We assume that 6 is so small that (A.6) holds with p = w/4, that is, 
ok(s) I q. 
Now suppose that (A.9) does not hold for all k 2 k-, and therefore, 
u(x;n+l,...,x;+l) <C-a 
for some m 2 k- . Without loss of generality, we assume 
U(Z;n,... ,x2) 2 C--C%. 
(A.ll) 
(A.12) 
(A.13) 
Then by (A.lO) 
Assumption (A. 12) implies 
cl n au(x;n,...,x~) > w i=l dXi 2’ 
In other words, (XT,. . . , xr) lies in AZ,,. Now, arguing as in the proof of (A.?‘) (replacing k by 
m and r by w/2) and using (A.ll) and (A.13), we find that 
n au(xy,...,xT) zL(x~+‘,..., xp”) 221(x;” )..., x:)+X 
dxi 
6 + o(6) 
i=l 
2 ‘11 (x;“, . . . , x~)+$-~>u(x;11...,z~) 
which contradicts (A.12). The proof is completed. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
REFERENCES 
G.M. Grossman and E. Helpman, Innovation and Grourth in the Global Economy, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, 
(1991). 
G. Hutschenreiter, Yu.M. Kaniovski and A.V. Kryszhimskii, Endogenous growth, absorptive capacities, 
and international R & D spillovers, Working Paper WP-95-92, International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, (1995). 
V.F. Borisov, G. Hutschenreiter and A.V. Kryashimskii, Asymptotic growth rates in knowledge-exchanging 
economies, Annals of Operations Research (to appear). 
C. Watanabe, B. Zhu and B. Asgari, Analysis on global technology spillover and its impact to technology man- 
agement, Abstract of Annual Conference of the Japan Society for Science Policy and Research Management 
(Tokyo, 1998), pp. 369-374, (1998). 
Yu.B. Germeyer, Games with Nonantagonistic Interests, (in Russian), Nauka, Moscow, (1976). 
T. Basar and G.J. Olsder, Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory, Academic Press, London, (1982). 
N.N. Vorobyov, Games Theory, (in Russian), Nauka, Moscow, (1985). 
S. Smale, The prisoner’s dilemma and dynamical systems associated to non-cooperative games, Econometrica 
48, 1617-1634, (1980). 
R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, New York, (1984). 
D. Fudenberg and D.M. Krebs, Learning mixed equilibria, Games and Econ. Behavior 5, 320-367, (1993). 
M. Nowak and K. Sigmund, The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner’s dilemma, Acta Applic. 
Math. 20, 247-265, (1992). 
Yu.M. Kaniovski and H.P. Young, Learning dynamics in games with stochastic perturbations, Games and 
Econ. Behavior 11, 33&363, (1995). 
K.L. Arrow and M. Kurz, Public Investment, The Rate of Return and Optimal Fiscal Policy, John Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, MD, (1970). 
M. Intriligator, Mathematical Optimization and Economic Theory, Prentice-Hall, New York, (1971). 
C. Watanabe, Trends in substitution of production factors to technology-Empirical analysis of the inducing 
impact of the energy crises on Japanese industrial technology, Research Policy 21, 481-505, (1992). 
